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24 January 1963
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100160043-0

25X1

NRO - ORGANIZATION

Blind Memo (drafted by HScoville) and sent
to the DCI (McCone)

After 12 months of operation, it appears that the NRO has failed to serve its intended purpose of providing for the management of aerial recon, manned a/c and satellites, including ELINT satellites, in a manner which will meet the needs of all agencies carrying a responsibility in this area.

1. The agreement does not provide for NRO authority over actual recon opns.
2. Programming and budgeting and related problem of management of R&D and procurement and control of appropriated funds are not well established and being handled under compromise arrangement among Secty McNamara, Dep Sec Gilpatric and the DCI rather than clear-cut understanding.
3. Planning for future of recon, new and improved systems and packages, is NRO responsibility ~~xxx~~ with coordination by CIA. DCI has been informed of little in way of long-range plans and fears whether a sound forward-looking program is in the mill. PFIAB has questioned this several times.
4. Poor linkage between NRO and USIB as well as DIA. COMOR had not worked out a targeting plan for first flight of LANYARD scheduled in Feb. and NRO ruled that the COMOR members (except the Chairman) would not be briefed on LANYARD for security reasons. Therefore COMOR knew nothing of LANYARD until 17 January.

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5. CIA reps have been told by NRO staff that they are "out of the picture" and will not be informed on any NRO plans and programs other than projects for which

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CIA has responsibility.

For above reasons and to clear up problems outlined, believe the NRO should be reconsidered and a new form of organization worked out.

Drafted by HSJr.
Sent to McCone.

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NRO

TS,

24 Jan 1963

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McCone/Scoville memo

After 12 months of operation, it appears that the NRO has failed to serve its intended purpose of providing for the management of aerial reconnaissance, manned aircraft and satellites, including ELINT satellites, in a manner which will meet the needs of all agencies carrying a responsibility in this area.

Deficiencies: Agreement does not provide for NRO authority over actual reconnaissance operations. Several programs still being carried on without direction or coordination by NRO.

NRO responsibilities for programming, budgeting and R&D and procurement not well established and being handled under compromise arrangements.

Future planning ~~obviously~~ not being coordinated with DCI.

Poor linkage between NRO and USIB .

CIA not a part of NRO except as Executive Agent for programs such as OXCART. CIA representatives have been told by NRO they are "out of the picture" and that they neither are entitled to, or necessarily will be informed of, NRO plans and programs.

Believe NRO should be reorganized:

NRO should be executive agent for NRP which ~~should~~ be directed by SecDef and DCI jointly.

~~DNOR~~NRO to be appointed by SecDef with approval of DCI, and DNRO selected from CIA in chain of command fully and currently informed, enter into councils and decisions of NRO, responsible for interrelationship and liaison between NRO and USIB and its Subcommittees, COMOR,.....

NRO shld be responsible for all overflights, manned and satellite, photo and elint, not including peripheral SIGINT) and should be responsible for obtaining approval of Special Group.

Also responsible for future planning.

NRO should have authority to employ facilities of the Services, Jt. Commands and CIA in executing its plans, and NRO not the agencies should be final authority on what is done.

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15 June 63

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Memo for ExDir from
DDCI (Gen Carter)

ER-63-841
30 Jan 1963

25X1 [redacted] Redone as unnumbered blind memo
and copy presented by DCI McCone to Mr. Gilpatric
who

"thought the NRO program as proposed was fine
and was prepared to implement it in toto, to include
having the CIA deputy directly in the NRO chain of
command on an operating basis as a true deputy.
Gilpatric did not think that the Director of NRO had
to mandatorily be on a full-time basis but certainly
had to spend more time at it than Dr. Charyk. The
Director gave Mr. Gilpatric the paper."